The extent of the dependence of early Greek cosmogony on mythical conceptions has long been a prolific source of controversy. Views on the subject have varied from Professor Cornford's claim that ‘there is a real continuity between the earliest rational speculation and the religious representation that lay behind it’ to Professor Burnet's extreme statement, ‘it is quite wrong to look for the origins of Ionian science in mythological ideas of any kind.’ The solution of the problem that I wish to (...) suggest is one which should satisfy those who insist on ‘the scientific character of the early Greek cosmology,’ while retaining a direct connection with pre-scientific beliefs—namely, that some, at least, of the earliest philosophers founded their doctrines of the beginning of the universe on a deliberate rationalization of earlier and contemporary mythical ideas. The appearance of notions like the ‘world-egg’ in a number of passages, too well known for quotation, shows that primitive cosmogony assumed an analogy between the generation of the world and the generation of animate creatures. I believe it can be proved that, so far from the ‘renunciation of sexual imagery’ which even Professor Cornford has recently attributed to Anaximander, he and other philosophers retained the habit of regarding cosmogony and anthropogony as parallel phenomena, only substituting for the mythical ‘world-egg’ a more scientific view of the embryo and its development. They looked at the world through the same spectacles as their predecessors, but after wiping from them the rose tint of mythological fancy. (shrink)

This article is a survey of familiar ground—those passages of the Poetics of Aristotle which throw light on the treatment of legend by the tragic poets. Although sweeping generalizations are often made on the use of the traditional stories in drama, our evidence on the subject is slight and inconclusive. We have little knowledge of the form in which most of the legends were known to the Attic playwrights, for the few we find in the Iliad and Odyssey appear there (...) in very different versions from those they take on in the plays, and the fragmentary remains of epic and lyric poetry between Homer and the fifth century B.C. present us with a wide field for speculation, but few certain facts; while vase paintings and other works of art supplement only here and there the scanty information gained from literature.The comments of ancient writers on this aspect of tragedy are surprisingly few, and carry us little farther. The Poetics stands out as the one source from which we can draw any substantial account of the matter. Even Aristotle, of course, is not directly concerned with the history of drama, and deals with it only incidentally in isolated passages; and in considering these it must constantly be borne in mind that he is discussing tragedy as he knew it in the late fourth century, for the benefit of fourth-century readers. But even so, his statements are the main foundation on which our view of the dramatists' use of legend must be built. (shrink)

This article is a survey of familiar ground—those passages of the Poetics of Aristotle which throw light on the treatment of legend by the tragic poets. Although sweeping generalizations are often made on the use of the traditional stories in drama, our evidence on the subject is slight and inconclusive. We have little knowledge of the form in which most of the legends were known to the Attic playwrights, for the few we find in the Iliad and Odyssey appear there (...) in very different versions from those they take on in the plays, and the fragmentary remains of epic and lyric poetry between Homer and the fifth century B.C. present us with a wide field for speculation, but few certain facts; while vase paintings and other works of art supplement only here and there the scanty information gained from literature.The comments of ancient writers on this aspect of tragedy are surprisingly few, and carry us little farther. The Poetics stands out as the one source from which we can draw any substantial account of the matter. Even Aristotle, of course, is not directly concerned with the history of drama, and deals with it only incidentally in isolated passages; and in considering these it must constantly be borne in mind that he is discussing tragedy as he knew it in the late fourth century, for the benefit of fourth-century readers. But even so, his statements are the main foundation on which our view of the dramatists' use of legend must be built. (shrink)

In a note on this passage as far back as 1868, E. Wölmin 1 advanced the theory that the plural anulis is used here in a technical and stereotyped way as symbolic of equestrian rank. He is not sure whether such illogical use of the plural is to be found earlier than Tacitus or not.

Among questions receiving attention in this symposium of twenty-seven spokesmen of large organizations are these: What are the consequences, for discerning and acting upon values and responsibilities, of the complexity of today's public and private organizations? How are a man's duties and ethical alternatives affected by the fact that he is an administrator in a big corporate, academic, governmental, religious, or military institution? The perennial tension between democracy and efficiency in organizational decision-making is also amply documented. Almost every contributor refers (...) several devastating counter-instances to any simple formal procedure, utilitarian or idealist, for deciding among ethical options faced by the executive. But the conclusion, that there is no method applicable in all situations wherein choice is to be based on the ethical merits of the candidates alone, is less astonishing than the frequency with which it is drawn.--W. H. C. (shrink)

This is a study of what Spinoza intended to be the refutation of orthodox Judaism, and indeed, of all religious orthodoxy. The recovery of that refutation, as Strauss illustrates in his preface to this translation, is needed by theology because the progressive liberalization of religion has now reached the point where theology is hardly able to distinguish itself from sundry civil moralities. Owing to this beginning, both in its plan and execution this study has little in common with historical studies (...) of the origin of religious liberalism. Part I distinguishes the classical or Epicurean critique of religion, which did not entail enlightenment, from the modern critique, whose origin Strauss finds in Hobbes. Part II examines Spinoza's critique of orthodoxy, the critique of Calvin, the teaching on the relation between religion and politics, and the concept of Bible criticism. Since Strauss' guiding concern is to discover whether the critique of orthodoxy can be met from the grounds of orthodoxy, he takes great care to specify precisely the assumptions of each argument and the belief against which it is directed. When completed, this effort becomes the articulation of the conflict between reason and revelation. That conflict is shown as it is understood by each side, and Strauss assesses the vulnerability of each to the other.—H. C. (shrink)

The thesis of this work is that Spinoza's great originality was in methodology, and indeed, that he was "primarily a methodologist." Since the explicit theme of Spinoza's major works is politics and ethics, support for this thesis would require at a minimum an account of the relation of method to ethics, metaphysics and mechanistic physics. Not only is such an account wanting, but even while taking the Ethics as his primary text, the author dismisses as "irrelevant" its ostensible geometrical method. (...) Further, while "all Spinoza's thinking can be called mathematical," barely two pages are devoted to an exposition of his "mathematical method" per se. The thesis then can hardly be said to have been presented, much less sustained.—H. C. (shrink)

In this preface to his recent Critique de La Raison Dialectique, Sartre poses, and outlines an answer to, the question of the Critique, "Do we have today the means to constitute a structural, historical anthropology?" Distinguishing between "true" Marxism and that of Garaudy, Lefebvre, Lukacs and others, he accuses his contemporaries of explaining historical events by a rationalistic and fatalistic scientism in which the concrete existing subject gets lost. This un-Marxian "sclerosis" of Marxist concepts, says Sartre, is what accounts for (...) the prominence of existentialism; once Marxist anthropology recovers its "human foundation" in the comprehension of existence, existentialism will be re-absorbed within the sought-for method. Convinced that "true" Marxism does not consider human existence to be merely an economic-historical event, Sartre is not aware that the envisioned anthropology may transform Marxism more than existentialism.--W. H. C. (shrink)

With respect to "beginnings," Marxism-Leninism shares with Hegel the opinion that 1) man is a product of an historical process and hence has no fixed nature; 2) knowledge and its object are changeable, but there is an "absolute standpoint" created by change itself from which a view of the whole is obtainable. There is disagreement about the nature of the object known and hence also about the nature of the absolute standpoint. This study repeats the customary objection that Hegel begins (...) with thinking, whereas he ought to have begun with primitive human activity. Accordingly, Hegel ends with speculation whereas Marxism-Leninism issues in praxis. The best part of the study appears to be the discussion of the relation in Hegel between sensibility and thought, and therewith the relation between the beginning of the Logik and of the Phänomenologie.—H. C. (shrink)

Although 20th Century Polish philosophy is known in this country mainly through its logicians, there is also an active group of phenomenologists, whose most eminent member is Ingarden. These two volumes have been the lifework of the author in the sense that they present his systematic statement of themes he has pursued since his days in Freiburg as a student of Husserl. This book was published in Polish in 1946-1947. Niemeyer offers here not a translation but Ingarden's own German version. (...) It divides into two parts: existential ontology, which is contained in vol. I, and formal ontology, contained in vol. II and a soon to be published third volume. This work is not adequately characterized as phenomenology for the simple reason that phenomenologists are not thought to discuss science, while a great deal of Ingarden's discussion runs through areas presently known as philosophy of science, and moreover, the author makes extensive use of current logical and mathematical concepts and methods. Yet it is phenomenological in that Ingarden rejects the epistemological and semantical approaches to the external world as inadequate, holding that the problem can be articulated only on the level of ontology. His work is comparable in manner of treatment and purpose to Process and Reality and C. I. Lewis' Knowledge and Valuation. We recommend, for a brief look at what can and cannot be expected of this work, the section of vol. I entitled "Wissenschaft und Philosophie."—H. C. (shrink)

The religious controversies of the 17th century are of central importance to any attempt to appraise the role of Christianity in the genesis of "modern secular society." In the 18th century there was a clear understanding that modern philosophy was hostile to religion, as the French Revolution proclaimed. The reappraisal of this relation began in Hegel's Phänomenologie, and became explicit with Max Weber: secularism is the consequence of Christianity. The adjudication of this issue demands an evaluation of the interpretations of (...) the Bible and of Christian morality made by such men as Hobbes, Spinoza, and Bayle. According to the Enlightenment, they speak as believers only in order to interpret Christianity in such a way as to make it tolerate the new philosophy. Rex would correct this view of Bayle's intention; he would show that Protestantism, and in Bayle's case, Calvinism, is the source or a source of the belief in the sovereignty of reason. One may doubt whether Rex has proved that the Enlightenment misunderstood Bayle's intentions. Nevertheless, this study, the first part of which is devoted to the Pensées diverses sur la comète, the second to the Commentaire philosophique, is a very helpful guide to an extensive literature. And in his very attempt to prove his thesis Rex frequently brings to light aspects of Bayle's rhetoric that must be noticed in order to understand his writings.—H. C. (shrink)

The value of this book lies in its aspiration not to be a doxography, but to help us recover the tradition of the humanities or liberal arts, which Kristeller believes is presently threatened. It is easy to agree that this end would be promoted by a recovery of the original meaning of liberal education, as well as how it differs from the humanities and especially from humanism. The author intimates the rise of platonism in late medieval and renaissance thought signifies (...) a turn away from Aristotle's "divine science" and scholastic scientific theology to the study of man. The humanities would then take their origin from a change in orientation toward theology. While these opinions may be sound, this study does not show us that they are, for it rehearses opinion without exhibiting either its ground or import. Kristeller might have fulfilled his aim had he imitated the scholarship of the men he studies rather than that which thrives on the loss of the meaning of "liberal education." The eight philosophers are: Petrarch, Valla, Ficino, Pico, Pomponazzi, Telesio, Patrizi, Bruno. The appendix on the medieval antecedents of renaissance humanism is the best part of the book.—H. C. (shrink)

Vlachos' study reaches toward the center of Kant's political philosophy, and therewith presses pertinent difficulties in liberal or enlightenment politics. The central polemic arises from the attempt to unite an unchanging, universal morality with the ideal of the progress of mankind as the goal of all moral action. The good man strives after an ideal which is in principle unrealizable; he is estranged from the community and becomes a perpetual reformer. The many who are not capable of such moral striving (...) must be ruled either by the persuasion and habituation of positive law and the beliefs that support it, or by the force and terror of a tyrant. Kant's attempt to make his moral law politically responsible is appropriately called by the author la dialectique du progrès. From this standpoint Vlachos is able to present a comprehensive view of "cosmopolitan" morality.—H. C. (shrink)

Plamenatz here attempts to revive political philosophy through an examination of the great modern thinkers. In the introduction, he meets objections to political philosophy. His defense rests on the claim that there are fundamental and enduring problems common to political philosophy and social science, and that philosophers often discuss them more profoundly and succinctly than social scientists. He has difficulty meeting the charge that political philosophy is unscientific. Since the question of the nature, legitimacy and purpose of political philosophy is (...) thematic in every major writer Plamenatz examines, one expects to find it stressed, yet it is noticed only cursorily, perhaps because the author agrees with the critics that political philosophers "were under illusions about their theories." Volume I contains chapters on Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, Hume, Burke and Rousseau; Volume II on Bentham, early socialism, Hegel and Marxism.—H. C. (shrink)

Hudson's contribution is a general critical introduction to eighteenth century ethical intuitionism. Hudson divides intuitionism into two basic views: 1) "sentimentalism" or the "moral sense" view propounded by Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, and 2) "intellectualism," or the view that intuition is a form of reason or understanding, held in one form or another by Cudworth, Clarke, Balguy, and Price. Mention is also made of Butler, whom Hudson sees in the bridge position between the other extremes. After expounding these views, Hudson discusses (...) three outstanding questions raised, but not satisfactorily answered, by the eighteenth century intuitionists: i) How does one decide between conflicting obligations?; ii) Do all men intuit the "heads" of virtue?; iii) Is it our duty to do what is right or what we think right? Finally, in a brief critique, Hudson presents objections to intuitionism based primarily on his own view of the conditions that must be fulfilled in order to legitimately say "I know X." He also raises the problem of a criterion of "intuition."—C. L. H. (shrink)

Julian H. Franklin, scholar of constitutionalism in the late sixteenth century, has extended his researches into the late seventeenth century with this fine work on Locke and Locke’s immediate sources. Franklin’s book is short, concise, well-focused and carefully argued. It is also thought-provoking to a degree one would not expect from the modesty or historicity of the subject. Controversy over this problem of political rhetoric and science, once heated while lives and fates were involved, is now cold, and the problem (...) no longer seems to be ours. Franklin follows the reasoning of past thinkers and deftly joins in when he can, providing for us an exemplary model of political theory on the quiet: he makes old arguments relevant to us without forcing them and he detaches us from our alleged necessities without resorting to silly hypotheses. (shrink)

Julian H. Franklin, scholar of constitutionalism in the late sixteenth century, has extended his researches into the late seventeenth century with this fine work on Locke and Locke’s immediate sources. Franklin’s book is short, concise, well-focused and carefully argued. It is also thought-provoking to a degree one would not expect from the modesty or historicity of the subject. Controversy over this problem of political rhetoric and science, once heated while lives and fates were involved, is now cold, and the problem (...) no longer seems to be ours. Franklin follows the reasoning of past thinkers and deftly joins in when he can, providing for us an exemplary model of political theory on the quiet: he makes old arguments relevant to us without forcing them and he detaches us from our alleged necessities without resorting to silly hypotheses. (shrink)

"Historical recurrence" is an idea of uncertain but considerable breadth conceived by G. W. Trompf. Vaguer and wider than the notion of a cycle, it can mean "typical changes" or that "history somehow repeats itself". Besides the cycle it is said to include the alternation view, the reciprocal view, the reenactment view, renaissance, recurrence proceeding from the uniformity of human nature, similarity, parallelism, and lessons of the past. As Trompf traces this idea from antiquity to the Reformation he points out (...) many along the way who somehow contributed to its formation but rests on three who chiefly formulated some version of it: Polybius, Luke, and Machiavelli. These are seen as historians—even Luke is "an historian of the Hellenistic period" —to whom history somehow repeats itself. (shrink)

The Ontology for Biomedical Investigations (OBI) is an ontology that provides terms with precisely defined meanings to describe all aspects of how investigations in the biological and medical domains are conducted. OBI re-uses ontologies that provide a representation of biomedical knowledge from the Open Biological and Biomedical Ontologies (OBO) project and adds the ability to describe how this knowledge was derived. We here describe the state of OBI and several applications that are using it, such as adding semantic expressivity to (...) existing databases, building data entry forms, and enabling interoperability between knowledge resources. OBI covers all phases of the investigation process, such as planning, execution and reporting. It represents information and material entities that participate in these processes, as well as roles and functions. Prior to OBI, it was not possible to use a single internally consistent resource that could be applied to multiple types of experiments for these applications. OBI has made this possible by creating terms for entities involved in biological and medical investigations and by importing parts of other biomedical ontologies such as GO, Chemical Entities of Biological Interest (ChEBI) and Phenotype Attribute and Trait Ontology (PATO) without altering their meaning. OBI is being used in a wide range of projects covering genomics, multi-omics, immunology, and catalogs of services. OBI has also spawned other ontologies (Information Artifact Ontology) and methods for importing parts of ontologies (Minimum information to reference an external ontology term (MIREOT)). The OBI project is an open cross-disciplinary collaborative effort, encompassing multiple research communities from around the globe. To date, OBI has created 2366 classes and 40 relations along with textual and formal definitions. The OBI Consortium maintains a web resource providing details on the people, policies, and issues being addressed in association with OBI. (shrink)

_Psychological Types_ is one of Jung's most important and most famous works. First published by Routledge in the early 1920s it appeared after Jung's so-called fallow period, during which he published little, and it is perhaps the first significant book to appear after his own confrontation with the unconscious. It is the book that introduced the world to the terms 'extravert' and 'introvert'. Though very much associated with the unconscious, in _Psychological Types_ Jung shows himself to be a supreme theorist (...) of the conscious. In putting forward his system of psychological types Jung provides a means for understanding ourselves and the world around us: our different patterns of behaviour, our relationships, marriage, national and international conflict, organizational functioning. Appearing in paperback for the first time this central volume from Jung's Collected Works will be essential to anyone requiring a proper understanding of Jung's psychology. (shrink)

The social, educational and political writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau have become enormously influential in the 200 years since his death. But the breadth as well as the depth of Rousseau's achievement - he was amongst other things a creative writer and musical composer as well as a philosopher - is not always appreciated. In around 100 articles, alphabetically arranged and fully cross-referenced, N. J. H. Dent explores all facets of Rousseau's work and thoughts, while his subject's remarkable life is summarized (...) in a biographical introduction. Details of works by and about Rousseau are listed in an extensive bibliography. For students or general readers seeking an introduction to Rousseau's work, and for those already familiar with the material who require a convenient reference source, this dictionary is essential reading. (shrink)

At Moore’s time, the main-stream ethical theory is the doctrine that pleasure alone is good as an end as held by the hedonistic utilitarianism. Moore, however, asserts that good, not composed of any parts, is a simple notion and indefinable, and naturalistic ethical theories, in particular hedonistic utilitarianism, interpret intrinsic good as a property of a single natural object---pleasure, which is also the sole end of life, thus violates naturalistic fallacy. Moore seems to believe that there exist things other than (...) pleasure that are also intrinsically good and has searched for them. But Moore has not clearly stated what these things are, nor has he given any justification for why they are intrinsically good. This paper discusses Moore’s arguments and difficulties of utilitarianism. With the subjectivistic utilitarian theory of value, Unified Utilitarian Theory (UTT) discards the classification of value into intrinsic and instrumental and proves to be exempt of all theexisting difficulties with utilitarianism related to pleasure, including naturalistic fallacy, vagueness of pleasure and sole end of life, double counting, etc. (shrink)

The relation between Emanuel Swedenborg and Immanuel Kant has been the subject of many discussions. The chief aim of this paper is not to elucidate this question from an historical point of view, but to compare the teachings of the two thinkers, as those teachings have come to us. Kant's "Träme eines Geistersehers" embodies a very unfavourable opinion about Swedenborg. It is a curious circumstance, that this judgement is not based on decisive arguments. On the contrary, Swedenborg's fundamental doctrines about (...) the existence of a spiritual world and the communication between the living and the dead, are accepted by Kant as plausible. Du Prel and others have concluded, that Kant was a Swedenborgian in his heart, and that his negative attitude was due to the fear of losing his scientific reputation. A careful consideration of the two philosophical systems does not tend to bear out this opinion; nevertheless, such a comparative study is very instructive. In the mental development of the two thinkers there are remarkable analogies. Both were occupied with the great problems of God and the human soul; and both were disappointed by the leading philosophical and theological doctrines of their days. To Swedenborg those doctrines seemed to lead straightforwardly to naturalism and atheism. Kant was struck by the diversity of the opinions expressed and by the succession of heterogeneous doctrines without lasting results. But the reactions of the two men in these circumstances were different. In his cosmological and anatomical works Swedenborg aims at acquiring a comprehensive view of the Universe, in which view God and the soul should obtain their proper places. When he had reached the age of about 55 years, a crisis set in, which he described as "the opening of his spiritual senses". From that time he could see the spiritual world and speak with its inhabitants; he could study the workings of God and of the soul with the help of living experience. Kant raised the question, whether there are departments of knowledge in which certainty is attainable, and what is the ground of this certainty. His answer is, that the fundamental propositions of mathematical physics are absolutely certain. The ground lies in the fact, that these propositions are not derived from experience, but that they are "synthetic judgments a priori". They express the workings of the "categories" and "forms of intuition". by means of which the mind constructs, out of a chaos of sense-impressions, the ordered universe of science. Of objects to which these propositions do not apply, e.g. God and the soul, no certain knowledge is possible. This precludes the knowledge of "another world", fundamentally different from our ordinary world. So there seems to be an irreconcilable opposition between the teachings of Kant and of Swedenborg, But further considerations tend to lessen this contrast. Notwithstanding his own teaching, Kant accepted a life after death and he even speculated on it. If we follow this example, we come to remarkable conclusions. It is reasonable to suppose, that the spirits, who have been men, use the same categories as we do. Then out of the impressions which reach them, they will construct a world built on the same pattern as our earthly world. So life before and after death will not be very different. And this is precisely Swedenborg's teaching. This may be confirmed by the experiences of our dream-life. In dreams, our mind out of different impressions builds a world closely resembling our ordinary world. The spiritual world, as described by Swedenborg, presents many analogies with the world of our dreams. Now it is a very remarkable circumstance, that modern physics has been under the necessity of modifying the system of categories as described by Kant. In quantum mechanics the connection between cause and effect is less stringent than in classical mechanics. This adds fresh interest to the study of a system like that of Swedenborg, where quantitative laws are largely replaced by qualitative laws. (shrink)

Joseph Beuys was one of the most significant artists of the 20th century. He was a gunner and radio operator in the German Air Force during World War II, and was severely injured several times. In March 1943 he had a life-changing experience after the dive bomber he was assigned to crashed in the Crimean peninsula. This trauma influenced Beuys' entire artistic career, and is known in art history as the ’Tartar Legend’ or ’Tartar Myth’. Profoundly affected by the crash, (...) the severe trauma, the near-death experience and his rescue, which he perceived as a “rebirth”, Beuys no longer saw himself, other people or society as a whole in the same way as previously. With his new consciousness, he ignored boundaries and created visions whereby all mankind could experience the healing he had undergone. Beuys did not bring society far enough for the turning point towards “the healing of the world” to be visible, yet today it is important to keep his work alive as a record of his extraordinary strength, which arose from trauma and severe injury, and was carried by a passionate commitment to mankind and to life itself. (shrink)

The DAMA project is an observatory for rare processes and it is operative deep underground at the Gran Sasso National Laboratory of the I.N.F.N. In particular, the DAMA/LIBRA (Large sodium Iodide Bulk for RAre processes) set-up consists of highly radiopure NaI(Tl) detectors for a total sensitive exposed mass of ≃250 kg. Recent results, obtained by this set-up by exploiting the model independent annual modulation signature of Dark Matter (DM) particles, have confirmed and improved those obtained by the former DAMA/NaI experiment. (...) A model independent evidence for the presence of Dark Matter particles in the galactic halo is cumulatively obtained at 8.2 σ C.L. No systematics or side reactions able to account for the measured modulation amplitude and to contemporaneously satisfy all the many specific requirements of the signature have been found or suggested by anyone over more than a decade. An example of one of the many possible model dependent corollary quests for the candidate particles and for the related astrophysical, nuclear and particle physics scenarios is presented considering the whole cumulative exposure. Future perspectives are shortly addressed. (shrink)

This note is in answer to some criticisms by professor mundle of dobb's work on the above topic. he first presents a general argument, relevant to those criticisms, regarding the physical significance of the fifth dimension. (staff).

Experiments are described, using electroencephalography (EEG) and simple tests of performance, which support the hypothesis that collapse of a quantum field is of importance to the functioning of the brain. The theoretical basis of our experiments is derived from Penrose (1989) who suggested that conscious decision-making is a manifestation of the outcome of quantum computation in the brain involving collapse of some relevant wave function. He also proposed that collapse of any wave function depends on a gravitational criterion. As different (...) brain areas are known to subserve different functions, we argue that `Penrose collapse' must occur in a particular brain area when performing a task that uses it. Further, taking an EEG from the area should amplify the gravitational prerequisite for collapse, so affecting task performance. There are no non-quantum theories which could lead one to expect that taking an EEG could directly affect task performance by subjects. The results of both pilot and main experiments indicated that task performance was indeed influenced by taking an EEG from relevant brain areas. Control experiments suggested that the influence was quantum mechanical in origin, and was not due to any experimental artefact. The results are statistically significant and merit attempts at replication in an independent laboratory, preferably with more sophisticated equipment than was available to us. (shrink)

This bilingual volume—English and German on facing pages—brings together the writings Wittgenstein composed during his stay in Dublin between October 1948 and March 1949, one of his most fruitful periods. He later drew more than half of his remarks for Part II of _Philosophical Investigations_ from this Dublin manuscript. A direct continuation of the writing that makes up the two volumes of _Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology,_ this collection offers scholars a glimpse of Wittgenstein's preliminary thinking on one of (...) his most important works. G. H. von Wright and Heikki Nyman both teach at the University of Helsinki. (shrink)

I Take and as correlative terms: to say of words or other symbols that they have meaning is to say that they are understood, or could be understood, by some interpreter. To specify a meaning fully, one must specify the interpreter or class of interpreters who do or might understand the symbols in a given way. There aretwo ways of doing this for a given utterance of words: we can take the interpretation which the utterer intended () the words to (...) receive, or the interpretation which would be given to them by the majority of speakers of the language to which they belong (or a specially qualified group of such speakers). In the vast majority of cases these interpretationswill coincide; in a small minority of cases they will not. Sometimes a speaker will coin a new word, or use an old word in a new sense. Sometimes he will ignorantly or carelessly intend his words to be interpreted in a way inwhich they would not be interpreted by most understanders of his language. In cases of this kind, we have to distinguish between and . (English judges, in interpreting statutes, are supposed to consider only the former, ignoring the latter; but usually it is rather the latter which matters.) Normally,however, an utterer of words uses them with meanings already determined independently of his use of them (though not, of course, independently of the totality of uses of them). (shrink)

I. Since the beginnings of philosophy, in all cultures which have produced any, religion and philosophy have been closely tied up together, and have often been uneasy yoke-fellows, each at times feeling it a duty to combat the other. I think there are two main reasons for this, All higher religions develop a theology, or systematic statement of doctrine; the philosopher tends to regard this as a spurious kind of philosophy or science that deliberately neglects inconvenient facts; while the theologian (...) in his turn suspects the philosopher of ignoring important data which he ought to consider, viz.: the phenomena of concrete religion, Akin to this is the tendency of both parties to use the word “God” in a different sense; Pascal’s objection that the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob is not the God of the philosophers is prima facie justified. Nevertheless both parties might have a claim to use the word. (shrink)

I. The Antiope.—The papyrus fragments of theAntiope, written in a small and crabbed hand of the third century B.C., were first published by Mahaffy in vol. 1 of the Petrie papyri in 1891, a time when the study of writing on papyrus was in its early days and there was not the abundance of other literary texts to provide practice and comparison that there is to-day. An advance in the study of the text was made by Blass in 1892, whose (...) readings were based on first-hand knowledge of the manuscript; he was followed by von Arnim, who in his text in the Supplementum Euripideum introduced several startling alterations, based on the autotypes alone and very rarely justified by the papyrus. A landmark in the history of the text was reached when Hans Schaal published his dissertation De Euripidis Antiopa; not only had he studied the papyrus closely in London, but he was able to make use of several readings of Wilamowitz. Though he left some of the major problems unattacked, perhaps too readily, his text represents a great advance on that of his predecessors, and I have found his readings in the majority of cases where he differs from Mahaffy or von Arnim confirmed by the papyrus, and consequently I have taken his text as the basis of my collation. That there was still a little more to be deciphered was suggested to me by the late Dr. Hunt, and I am indebted to him as the instigator of these notes if there is anything of value in them. (shrink)

Almost everybody has a conscience, though it may not play a dominating or even very prominent role in his life. To have a conscience is to classify some kinds of action as morally right and others as morally wrong, and to be disposed to do the former and avoid doing the latter. To judge an action as morally right or wrong is not to judge it as advantageous or disadvantageous to the agent; the motive for acting conscientiously cannot be pure (...) self-interest. It is a mark of my thinking an action morally right that I am disposed to do it even though doing it will involve me in a net loss of enjoyment or a net surplus of suffering. A man who is only disposed to do such things as he thinks will increase his happiness in the long run has no conscience. Conscience presents itself to a person as a kind of constraint which he cannot evade on the ground that it will be inconvenient to comply with it. (shrink)

It is unclear whether someone’s responsibility for developing a disease or maintaining his or her health should affect what healthcare he or she receives. While this dispute continues, we suggest that, if responsibility is to play a role in healthcare, the concept must be rethought in order to reflect the sense in which many health-related behaviours occur repeatedly over time and are the product of more than one agent. Most philosophical accounts of responsibility are synchronic and individualistic; we indicate here (...) what paying more attention to the diachronic and dyadic aspects of responsibility might involve and what implications this could have for assessments of responsibility for health-related behaviour. (shrink)

I. The Antiope.—The papyrus fragments of theAntiope, written in a small and crabbed hand of the third century B.C., were first published by Mahaffy in vol. 1 of the Petrie papyri in 1891, a time when the study of writing on papyrus was in its early days and there was not the abundance of other literary texts to provide practice and comparison that there is to-day. An advance in the study of the text was made by Blass in 1892, whose (...) readings were based on first-hand knowledge of the manuscript; he was followed by von Arnim, who in his text in the Supplementum Euripideum introduced several startling alterations, based on the autotypes alone and very rarely justified by the papyrus. A landmark in the history of the text was reached when Hans Schaal published his dissertation De Euripidis Antiopa; not only had he studied the papyrus closely in London, but he was able to make use of several readings of Wilamowitz. Though he left some of the major problems unattacked, perhaps too readily, his text represents a great advance on that of his predecessors, and I have found his readings in the majority of cases where he differs from Mahaffy or von Arnim confirmed by the papyrus, and consequently I have taken his text as the basis of my collation. That there was still a little more to be deciphered was suggested to me by the late Dr. Hunt, and I am indebted to him as the instigator of these notes if there is anything of value in them. (shrink)

At the University of Newcastle, health law and ethics is taught and assessed in each year of the five-year curriculum. However, the critical question for assessment remains: 'Does teaching ethics have a measurable effect on the clinical activity of medical students who have had such courses?' Those responsible for teaching confront this question each year they sit down to construct their assessment tools. Should they assess what the student knows? Should they assess the student's moral reasoning, that is, what decisions (...) the student makes, and, how these decisions are justified, or should they assess what the student actually does when dealing with patients in the clinical setting, and how he or she does it? From 1982 to 1991, assessment at Newcastle was primarily aimed at determining the quality of the students' ethics knowledge base. This paper describes the strengths and limitations of a purely knowledge-based method of evaluation and why in 1992, we are now attempting to redefine and assess, what we call 'clinical ethical competence' in terms of how students actually apply this knowledge base in a controlled clinical context. (shrink)

The principal contemporary moral views are treated under three headings: 1) Intuitionism, represented by G. E. Moore, H. A. Prichard, and W. D. Ross; 2) Emotivism, as expounded by C. L. Stevenson; and 3) Prescriptivism, R. M. Hare's view. Warnock carefully distinguishes the questions these views were designed to answer from the questions which he feels they do in fact answer. Warnock emphasizes throughout the problem of the relation between moral discourse and conduct, as well as the question of the (...) possibility of moral "argument" in the sense of giving "reasons" for a moral viewpoint. In the latter half of the volume Warnock sketches what he takes to be some of the necessary requirements for a more adequate moral theory. He discusses "Naturalism" and rejects the blanket term as misleading unless the precise view one labels "naturalistic" is spelled out. Warnock distinguishes two "anti-naturalist" views: 1) that description and evaluation are different, i.e., that evaluation is not "reducible" to description and 2) that they are logically independent. He considers 1) a platitude. He accepts 2), but rejects what might be considered a further implication of this view—that absolutely anything might be regarded as a criterion of evaluation. In conclusion Warnock suggests that it might be profitable to look for the distinctive features of moral discourse in the content rather than the form. A good introduction to critical thinking, Warnock's account raises more questions than it answers.—C. L. H. (shrink)

Hudson's contribution is a general critical introduction to eighteenth century ethical intuitionism. Hudson divides intuitionism into two basic views: 1) "sentimentalism" or the "moral sense" view propounded by Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, and 2) "intellectualism," or the view that intuition is a form of reason or understanding, held in one form or another by Cudworth, Clarke, Balguy, and Price. Mention is also made of Butler, whom Hudson sees in the bridge position between the other extremes. After expounding these views, Hudson discusses (...) three outstanding questions raised, but not satisfactorily answered, by the eighteenth century intuitionists: i) How does one decide between conflicting obligations?; ii) Do all men intuit the "heads" of virtue?; iii) Is it our duty to do what is right or what we think right? Finally, in a brief critique, Hudson presents objections to intuitionism based primarily on his own view of the conditions that must be fulfilled in order to legitimately say "I know X." He also raises the problem of a criterion of "intuition."—C. L. H. (shrink)

An attempt to give a comprehensive scientific account of the creative process. Humor, scientific discovery and art are all understood as dependent upon the act of "bisociation," the spontaneous intersecting of two or more previously unrelated frames of reference or "matrices." The first half of the book propounds this theory; the second half attempts to give its physical and psychological underpinnings. Though he fails to give any definite answer to how and why the bisociative act takes place, Koestler's erudition, insights (...) and considerable skill as a writer are impressive.—S. C. H. (shrink)

Searches for non-paulian nuclear processes, i.e. processes normally forbidden by the Pauli–Exclusion–Principle (PEP) with highly radiopure NaI(Tl) scintillators allow the test of this fundamental principle with high sensitivity. Status and perspectives are addressed.

This is a companion paper to my preceding one on Harriot's experimentations in the field of the sign-rule of multiplication in algebra. Cardano had earlier attacked the conventional rule in a chapter of his De Aliza regula liber, published in 1570 as an appendix to the second edition of his Ars magna. He returned to the subject in a brief tract, published nearly a century later in his collected works as Sermo de plus et minus. Only Cardano's valid contention that (...) the standard ‘proof’ of the accustomed sign-rule was faulty made impact, in the Euclidean background to which the ‘proof’ belonged. His cause was to preserve the purity of the Euclidean tradition. It overshadows the true aim in the De Aliza chapter, but the Sermo reveals it plainly as far from retrograde: he wished to retain all the new techniques of algebra that brought in not only ‘minus’ quantities but also their square roots, and to escape the ‘impossible’ status of these last. This the rebel sign-rule did for him by making every root of a ‘minus’ just another ‘minus’. (shrink)

At the end of the most violent century in human history, it is good to take stock of our commitments to human and other life forms, as well as to examine the rights and the duties that might flow from their biological makeup. Professor Thomasma and Professor Loewy have held a long-standing dialogue on whether there are moral differences between animals and humans. This dialogue was occasioned by a presentation Thomasma made some years ago at Loewy's invitation at the University (...) of Illinois, Peoria, Medical Center. During that presentation, Thomasma argued that human beings are sufficiently distinct from other animals genetically and otherwise to justify a moral difference in rights and obligations. In effect, he argued that there are species-specific rights. This essay will pick up the threads of that dialogue. (shrink)